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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 Congress enacted 47 U.S.C. § 230 (“Section 230”)1 to encourage the development of the 
Internet and other interactive media by shielding intermediaries not only from liability for 
actionable content created or posted by third parties, but also from the cost and uncertainty 
associated with litigation itself. If online service providers were required to engage in protracted 
and expensive litigation whenever plaintiffs alleged that they were harmed by user-generated 
content hosted or transmitted by intermediaries, these online platforms for users’ speech would 
inevitably become more expensive, more restrictive, and ultimately less available for individual 
expression. 
Section 230 must thus be interpreted broadly to immunize all conduct interrelated with 
the publication of third-party content regardless of how that conduct is labeled in the complaint. 
Likewise, exceptions to Section 230, including the federal criminal law and intellectual property 
exceptions, must be construed narrowly. Section 230 must certainly immunize against right of 
publicity claims that are invasion of privacy, not intellectual property, claims. 
Given this, amici urge this Court to grant Backpage.com’s motion to dismiss. 
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE2 
The amici each have a strong interest in ensuring that the Internet remains a vibrant and 
diverse medium, and that service providers not be saddled with the expense of litigation or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  This was Section 509 of the Communications Decency Act, which was part of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104. 
2 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(c)(5), no party’s counsel authored this brief 
in whole or in part, and neither any party, nor any party’s counsel, contributed money towards 
the preparation of this brief. No person other than amici, its members, or its counsel contributed 
money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting this brief. Defendants have consented 
to the filing of this brief and Plaintiffs take no position. 
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 2 
burdened with the duty of reviewing all content posted by its users. Amici believe their expertise 
in Section 230 can assist the Court in this matter.  
The Electronic Frontier Foundation (“EFF”) is a San Francisco-based, non-profit, 
member-supported civil liberties organization working to protect rights in the digital world. We 
actively encourage and challenge industry, government, and the courts to support free 
expression, privacy, and openness in the information society. Founded in 1990, EFF has nearly 
26,000 dues-paying members from across the United States. EFF has participated as amicus 
curiae in many cases involving claims against Internet intermediaries.  
 The Center for Democracy & Technology (“CDT”) is a non-profit, public interest, 
Internet policy organization. CDT represents the public’s interest in an open, innovative, and 
decentralized Internet, reflecting constitutional and democratic values of free expression, 
privacy, and individual liberty. CDT has also participated as amicus curiae in many cases 
involving claims against Internet intermediaries.  
Eric Goldman is a Professor of Law at Santa Clara University School of Law, where he is 
also Co-Director of the school’s High Tech Law Institute. His research and teaching focus on 
Internet law, intellectual property and marketing law. He is considered a national expert on 
Internet intermediary liability. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Section 230 Categorically Shields Internet Intermediaries from Liability Based on 
the Speech of Their Users 
 
Section 230 was born from, and intended to dispense with, a broad range of legal 
uncertainty that enveloped online service providers in the early stages of the popular Internet. In 
the early to mid-1990s, the risk of potentially burdensome regulation and litigation emerged as a 
concrete threat to the proliferation of speech on the Internet. Moreover, the imposition of 
Case 1:14-cv-13870-RGS   Document 39-1   Filed 03/09/15   Page 9 of 27
 3 
common law publisher liability, including distributor liability, on service providers was 
acknowledged to be both inconsistent with how the Internet works and a brake on its growth and 
development.3  
Congress’ decision to shield the providers of online speech channels has been 
instrumental to the development of the modern Internet: approximately 2.9 billion people or 
40 percent of the global population is online, and with “current growth rates, half of the world’s 
population will be online by 2017.”4 Many of these individuals use U.S.-based services to access 
and distribute all manner of content, from organizing in opposition to oppressive regimes5 to 
sharing pictures of children with grandparents. Today’s Internet hosts third-party contributions 
from a broad array of voices, facilitating the speech of billions. 
A. Congress Intended to Promote Freedom of Speech Online 
Congress enacted two separate but interrelated immunities. Section 230(c)(1) provides 
immunity for claims against providers of “interactive computer services”6 (such as website 
operators) for content posted on and through their platforms by third parties.7 Section 230(c)(2) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Zeran v. Am. Online, 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997). 
4 See The State of Broadband 2014: Broadband for All, Broadband Comm’n for Digital Dev. 
[UN agency for information and communications technology] (Sept. 2014), available at 
http://www.broadbandcommission.org/documents/reports/bb-annualreport2014.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 27, 2015). 
5 See, e.g., Philip N. Howard, et al., Opening Closed Regimes: What Was the Role of Social 
Media During the Arab Spring? (Project on Info. and Tech. & Political Islam, Working Paper 
2011.1), available at http://pitpi.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/2011_Howard-Duffy-Freelon-
Hussain-Mari-Mazaid_pITPI.pdf. 
6 “The term ‘interactive computer service’ means any information service, system, or access 
software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer 
server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such 
systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions.” 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(f)(2). 
7 Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1020 (9th Cir. 2003); Green v. Am. Online, 318 F.3d 465, 471 
(3d Cir. 2003). 
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 4 
provides immunity from claims based on the defendant’s removal or blocking of content from its 
Internet platform, or enabling others to do so.  
The immunity provided by Section 230 serves three main purposes. First, it keeps to a 
minimum governmental interference with the “‘robust nature of Internet communication’” by 
shielding intermediaries from tort liability for the speech of others.8 Second, “the immunity 
provided by Section 230 protects against the ‘heckler’s veto’ that would chill free speech” 
because otherwise those who disliked certain online content could pressure service providers to 
remove it or block access to it merely by threatening litigation.9 Third, the “Good Samaritan” 
immunity granted by Section 230(c)(2) was deemed necessary in order not to discourage online 
service providers from self-regulating by screening or blocking offensive content posted through 
them.10  
Given their ability to host a far greater range and volume of speech than had ever before 
been possible, Internet intermediaries were understandably wary of the potential exposure. While 
service providers could be held responsible for online content that they created, “a person who 
published or distributed speech over the Internet could be held liable for defamation even if he or 
she was not the author of the defamatory text, and, indeed, at least with regard to publishers, 
even if unaware of the statement.”11  
Indeed, the Internet would be a far more limited forum if websites were forced to second-
guess their decisions about hosting content that they themselves did not author. As the Fourth 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 407 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting 
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330). 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 407-08. 
11 Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1026-27 (citing Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 
323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995), where the New York state appellate court held that an Internet 
service provider could be held responsible for the defamatory words of one of its users where the 
provider attempted (and failed) to filter objectionable content from its site). 
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Circuit aptly noted, “It would be impossible for service providers to screen each of their millions 
of postings for possible problems. Faced with potential liability for each message republished by 
their services, interactive computer service providers might choose to severely restrict the 
number and type of messages posted.”12  
Congress thus chose to protect and foster the Internet as a forum for unrestrained robust 
communication and “not to deter harmful online speech through the separate route of imposing 
tort liability on companies that serve as intermediaries for other parties’ potentially injurious 
messages.”13 Congress clearly indicated that it was codifying a federal policy of non-regulation 
aimed at “preserv[ing] the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the 
Internet and other interactive computer services.”14 Specifically, Congress found that: 
• The Internet and other interactive computer services offer a forum for a 
true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural 
development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity; 
• The Internet and other interactive computer services have flourished, to 
the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government regulation; 
and 
• Increasingly Americans are relying on interactive media for a variety of 
political, educational, cultural, and entertainment services.15  
 
B. Courts Have Broadly Interpreted Section 230(c)(1)  
As the parties acknowledge, Section 230(c)(1) 16  bars claims if “(1) the defendant 
asserting immunity is an interactive computer service provider, (2) the particular information at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331. 
13 Id. at 330-31. 
14 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2). 
15 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3)-(5).  
16 “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or 
speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(c)(1). 
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 6 
issue was provided by another information content provider, and (3) the claim seeks to treat the 
defendant as a publisher or speaker of that information.”17  
Since the passage of Section 230, courts have routinely, and correctly, recognized the 
need to construe each of these requirements broadly to effectuate Congress’ policy choice.18 As 
the Ninth Circuit articulated, “[R]eviewing courts have treated § 230(c) immunity as quite 
robust, adopting a relatively expansive definition of ‘interactive computer service’ and a 
relatively restrictive definition of ‘information content provider.’”19  
Congress has also recognized the importance of expanding Section 230 immunity. For 
example, Congress in 2010 passed the SPEECH Act that states that U.S. courts “shall not 
recognize or enforce a foreign judgment for defamation against the provider of an interactive 
computer service” that is inconsistent with Section 230.20  
Although the statute does not affect the liability of users who themselves create 
actionable material, Section 230 operates to “protect [online service providers] from taking on 
liability” and hence helps encourage the development of forums to host speech of all types in 
“what is right now the most energetic technological revolution that any of us has ever 
witnessed.”21  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Jones, 755 F.3d at 409. 
18 See Universal Commc’ns Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 419 (1st Cir. 2007); Fair 
Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1174-75 (9th Cir. 
2008); Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 2006). 
19 Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003). 
20 Jones, 755 F.3d at 408 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 4102(c)(1); Pub.L. 111-223 (Aug. 10, 2010)). 
21 141 Cong. Rec. H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (Rep. Christopher Cox speaking in support of 
Section 230). 
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C. Lack of “Good Faith” Under Section 230(c)(2) Does Not Nullify Section 
230(c)(1) Immunity 
 
Plaintiffs have sued Backpage.com for harm they suffered that was allegedly caused by 
the ads placed on the website by traffickers. Any allegations, pursuant to Section 230(c)(2), that 
Backpage.com acted in “bad faith” in its efforts to block the posting of such ads have no bearing 
on the analysis of immunity under Section 230(c)(1) given that Plaintiffs’ claims are 
fundamentally based on third-party content. 
Section (c)(2) provides: 
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable 
on account of – 
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or 
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, 
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, 
whether or not such material is constitutionally protected; or 
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content 
providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material described in 
paragraph (1).22 
 
It is easiest to consider the Section 230 immunities as follows: subsection 230(c)(1) 
focuses on Internet intermediaries’ immunity from liability based on the harm plaintiffs suffered 
from the publication of third-party content; subsection 230(c)(2) provides a separate immunity to 
Internet intermediaries for claims brought by content creators themselves based on the 
intermediaries having removed or blocked their content or enabled others to do so.23  
Courts have interpreted the two subsections as creating two immunities applicable in 
distinct situations, recognizing that the statute only references “good faith” in 
subsection (c)(2)(A) and cannot be read to impose a good faith condition on immunity under 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Emphasis added. This reference to “(1)” should instead probably be “(A)”. 
23 See Barnes v. Yahoo!, 570 F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir. 2009); Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1030 n. 14. See 
also Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169, 1175-76 (9th Cir. 2009) (applying 
(c)(2)(B) to shield malware-detector from liability for removing plaintiff’s software from others’ 
computers). 
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Section 230(c)(1). Indeed, Section 230(c)(1) immunity has been applied in cases even where 
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants acted in bad faith because those cases involved claims that 
were grounded in the harm that flowed to the plaintiffs from content posted by others. Most 
recently, in Jones, 755 F.3d 398, the Sixth Circuit applied (c)(1) immunity despite allegations 
that the website operator had in bad faith encouraged the allegedly tortious third-party content.24 
By contrast, many courts have analyzed the question of good faith, and finding no absence of it, 
granted immunity pursuant to Section 230(c)(2) when plaintiffs sued Internet intermediaries for 
voluntarily flagging and filtering their messages as spam.25 Also focusing on the two distinct 
immunities, amicus Eric Goldman has written about Section 230(c)(2) immunity in relation to 
suits brought by account holders when intermediaries have chosen to shut down their accounts or 
profiles.26  
D. Internet Intermediaries May Only Be Subject to Suit If They Actively 
Develop Actionable Content 
 
Section 230(c)(1)’s immunity was designed and has repeatedly been judicially interpreted 
to be categorical for third-party content. A website operator – or any other provider of an 
interactive computer service – falls outside the protections of Section 230 only if it creates the 
specific content that is alleged to be actionable.27  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 See also Levitt v. Yelp! Inc., 2011 WL 5079526 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (finding (c)(1) immunity 
despite allegations of extortion); Giordano v. Romeo, 2011 WL 6782933 (Fla. App. Ct. 2011) 
(finding (c)(1) immunity despite website refusing to takedown user’s own defamatory post). 
25 See, e.g., Pallorium v. Jared, 2007 WL 80955 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007); e360Insight, LLC v. 
Comcast Corp., 546 F.Supp.2d 605 (N.D. Ill. 2008); Holomaxx Technologies v. Yahoo!, 2011 
WL 865794 (N.D. Cal. 2011); Holomaxx Technologies v. Microsoft Corp., 2011 WL 865278 
(N.D. Cal. 2011); Smith v. Trusted Universal Standards in Electronic Transactions, Inc. (d/b/a 
TRUSTe, Inc.), 2011 WL 900096 (D. N.J. 2011).  
26 Eric Goldman, Online User Account Termination and 47 U.S.C. §230(c)(2) (September 23, 
2011), UC Irvine Law Review, Vol. 2, 2012; Santa Clara Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper 
No. 19-11, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1934310. 
27 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3); Jones, 755 F.3d at 408-09. 
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Allegations that a website operator created “neutral tools” – such as a classified 
advertising website or a comments section on a website – by which users post actionable content 
or engage in illegal activities do not bring a service provider outside the protections of the 
statute. In Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th 
Cir. 2008), the court held that discriminatory statements made by users in the “additional 
comments” section provided by the site did not transform the site operator into an information 
content provider. 28  In Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. 
Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 2008), the Seventh Circuit similarly held that an 
online classified ad site was not an information content provider of allegedly discriminatory 
housing postings where the site operator neither induced nor required its users to post any 
discriminatory content.29 
Nor, as the Sixth Circuit recently explained, does a website operator lose immunity by 
encouraging users to provide content that may be actionable, or then commenting approvingly on 
that content.30 The arguments by Plaintiffs’ amici that Backpage.com should be liable because it 
“coaches” or “encourages” the posting of trafficking advertisements must thus be rejected.31   
Nor do any similar actions short of creating or requiring the creation of actionable content 
void Section 230(c)(1) immunity. Website operators do not become information content 
providers by categorizing third-party content. 32  Nor do they become information content 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Id. at 1174. 
29 Id. at 671. 
30 Jones, 755 F.3d at 409, 410 (citing Roommates.com). 
31 Brief of City and County of San Francisco, et al. at 11; Brief of Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts at 18. 
32 See, e.g., Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (rejecting argument that 
Craigslist became an information content provider “by having an ‘adult services’ category” and 
enabling users to search by sexual preference); Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 99 Cal. App. 4th 816, 832 
(2002) (rejecting argument that eBay became a content provider for auctions of counterfeit goods 
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providers by creating tools, such as search engines, to guide users in finding third-party content, 
or by disseminating such content.33  
By contrast, providers of interactive computer services become information content 
providers – and correspondingly lose Section 230(c)(1) immunity – only when they affirmatively 
author or otherwise develop the substance of the content in question. Although a provider may 
cross that threshold in multiple ways, at a minimum, a service provider must directly author or 
require others to author the illegal content. In Roommates.com, for example, while the site 
operator enjoyed protections regarding the creation of its open “additional comments” section, 
the Ninth Circuit held that it could still be liable for requiring users to use a form, authored by 
the website operator, to make selections that were allegedly actionable under the Fair Housing 
Act.34 The holding that Section 230 immunity did not apply in Roommates.com was extremely 
narrow, and Plaintiffs’ amici’s reliance on that case is misplaced given that Plaintiffs have not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
by collecting and displaying positive and negative feedback, hosting an auction site, and 
displaying seller’s product descriptions). 
33 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1167 (noting that “the broadest sense of the term ‘develop’ 
could include the functions of an ordinary search engine . . . [b]ut to read the term so broadly 
would defeat the purposes of section 230 by swallowing up every bit of the immunity that the 
section otherwise provides”); Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1197 (N.D. Cal. 
2009) (“[E]ven if a particular tool facilitates the expression of information, it generally will be 
considered ‘neutral’ so long as users ultimately determine what content to post, such that the tool 
merely provides a framework that could be utilized for proper or improper purposes.”) (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted). 
34 521 F.3d at 1166 (“By requiring subscribers to provide the information as a condition of 
accessing its service, and by providing a limited set of pre-populated answers, Roommate 
becomes much more than a passive transmitter of information provided by others; it becomes the 
developer, at least in part, of that information.”). See also Goddard, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 1198 
(“The Ninth Circuit’s partial denial of immunity to the website turned entirely on the website’s 
decision to force subscribers to divulge the protected characteristics and discriminatory 
preferences ‘as a condition of using its services.’”); F.T.C. v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 
1199 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding that a website operator that affirmatively solicited and paid 
researchers to publish confidential records protected by the law was an “information content 
provider” for Section 230 purposes). 
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alleged that Backpage.com required or forced traffickers to post certain content within their 
advertisements for underage sex.35     
Nor can Plaintiffs themselves plead around Section 230 by bringing various claims based 
on Defendants’ business practices or business model, including the  “design and operation” of 
the Backpage.com website.36 Plaintiffs’ claims are fundamentally grounded in the harm they 
allegedly suffered due to content posted by third parties, thus Plaintiffs should not be able to 
avoid the broad immunity granted intermediaries under Section 230(c)(1) unless Plaintiffs can 
show that Defendants’ actions made them an “information content provider” consistent with 
Roommates.com. Allowing Plaintiffs to create such a loophole for business practices claims 
would eviscerate Section 230 and undermine Congress’ goal of promoting “the continued 
development of the Internet and other interactive computer services and other interactive 
media.”37 
Finally, Plaintiffs’ attempt to circumvent Section 230’s immunity provisions based on 
Doe v. Internet Brands, 767 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2014), must also be rejected. First, the Ninth 
Circuit has vacated that opinion and ordered a rehearing of the appeal.38 But even if that opinion 
remained good law, it would have no applicability here. In the vacated opinion, the Ninth Circuit 
had held that the website operator did not have Section 230(c)(1) immunity – not because the 
plaintiff’s claim was based on actionable third-party content and the website operator was 
deemed a “publisher or speaker” of that content  – but because the plaintiff’s claim was based on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Brief of City and County of San Francisco, et al. at 11; Brief of Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts at 18. 
36 See Second Amended Complaint Counts I-III. 
37 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1). 
38 2015 WL 774493 (9th Cir. 2015). 
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the website’s own alleged negligence for failure to warn the plaintiff about the criminal acts of 
others who read, but did not post on, the website.39  
II.  The Federal Criminal Law Exception to Section 230 Immunity is Appropriately 
Limited to Criminal Prosecutions and Does Not Include Related Civil Actions 
 
 As Backpage.com has explained, the majority of courts have appropriately limited the 
federal criminal law exception to Section 230 immunity40 to criminal prosecutions.41 Including 
related civil actions in the exception would swallow the immunity rule and defeat Congress’ 
intent in enacting Section 230.  
Extending the federal criminal law exception beyond prosecutions to include civil actions 
authorized by criminal statutes would result in very serious practical consequences for freedom 
of speech and innovation online. Prosecutorial discretion and the higher standard of proof 
together mitigate the chilling effect created by the lack of immunity for Internet intermediaries 
against criminal prosecutions due to Section 230(e)(1). Limiting the exception makes practical 
sense given that government prosecutors generally exercise their discretion to bring criminal 
charges with care because so much is at stake in criminal cases – that is, the defendants’ life or 
liberty. Additionally, the standard of proof in criminal cases is much higher than in civil cases.  
Unlike federal prosecutors, private plaintiffs typically do not exercise such judiciousness 
in deciding whether to bring lawsuits where money damages are the remedy and the standard of 
proof is lower. Exposing Internet intermediaries to the whims of a broad array of civil claimants 
whose actions are authorized by criminal statutes would disincentivize online innovation and 
ultimately diminish the free speech and the free exchange of ideas and information that Internet 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 767 F.3d at 898-99. 
40 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1). 
41  Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 12(b)(6) at 20-23; Defendants’ Reply in Support Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 12(b)(6) of at 4-5. 
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platforms facilitate. This unfortunate result would be contrary to Congress’ recognition that “The 
Internet and other interactive computer services offer a forum for a true diversity of political 
discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual 
activity.”42 
This potential result is particularly concerning for amici who believe in the fundamental 
power of Internet platforms to be a force for good. Our concern about online service providers 
having to defend against civil claims authorized by federal criminal statutes goes far beyond 
classified ad websites like Backpage.com. There are numerous online communications platforms 
such as social media websites, email services, and instant messaging applications that, while they 
would not be able to invoke Section 230(c)(1) immunity if criminally prosecuted, should be able 
to do so if they find themselves subject to related civil lawsuits based on third-party content.  
For example, there are several federal crimes related to terrorism43 and aiding and 
abetting a crime is always a valid theory of liability pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2.44 Federal law also 
provides civil remedies for victims of international terrorism.45 It is possible (though not 
justifiable) that a federal prosecutor could seek to hold Twitter, for example, criminally liable for 
aiding and abetting terrorism because terrorists use Twitter to entice new recruits and advance 
their terrorism goals.46 This would be an outrageous exercise of prosecutorial discretion and 
would require a distorted reading of the criminal statutes, and any such prosecution would 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3). 
43 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331, et seq. 
44 United States v. McCambridge, 551 F.2d 865, 871 (1st Cir. 1977). Providing “material 
support” for terrorism is also a stand-alone crime similar to the aiding and abetting theory of 
liability. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A. 
45 18 U.S.C. § 2333. Many courts have recognized aiding and abetting under this civil cause of 
action. See, e.g., Gill v. Arab Bank, PLC, 893 F. Supp. 2d 474, 497-502 (E.D. N.Y. 2012). 
46 See Shane Harris, Justice Department: We’ll Go After ISIS’s Twitter Army, The Daily Beast 
(Feb. 23, 2015), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/02/23/justice-department-we-ll-go-
after-isis-twitter-army.html. 
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certainly fail on the merits. Nevertheless, if such a prosecution were brought, Twitter would not 
be able to invoke Section 230(c)(1) immunity due to Section 230(e)(1)’s clear exception for 
criminal prosecutions.  
However, if victims of international terrorism were to sue Twitter pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2333 on an attenuated (and, as noted above, not justifiable) theory of aiding and abetting 
terrorism by providing an open content-hosting platform that is used by (among millions of 
others) some engaged in terrorist activities, any proper reading of the federal criminal law 
exception to Section 230 leads to the conclusion that Twitter should be immune from this civil 
claim because the claim is ultimately based on third-party content that Twitter had no direct hand 
in creating or posting. To permit such a suit to go forward merely because claimants make a 
tenuous link to federal criminal law would eviscerate Section 230 immunity and undermine 
congressional intent given the myriad criminal statutes that authorize attendant private rights of 
action.  
That Plaintiffs’ expansive reading of the federal criminal law exception would enable the 
exception to swallow the rule is further evident when considered in light of state unfair 
competition laws such as California’s Business & Professions Code § 17200, which authorizes 
civil actions for violations of other laws, including federal criminal laws.47 A private party could 
“borrow” a federal criminal law as the underlying substantive violation for a § 17200 claim even 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Civil actions may be brought “by a person who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money 
or property as a result of the unfair competition.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204; see also 
Roskind v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 80 Cal.App.4th 345, 352-356 (2000) (finding 
that “case authority clearly provides that violation of a federal law may serve as a predicate for a 
section 17200 action” and holding that “since trading ahead constitutes the crime of mail fraud 
under federal law, it is actionable under the UCL, which borrows other law, including federal 
law, to define the ‘unlawful’ practices that are UCL violations.”). 
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when that federal criminal law does not itself authorize civil actions.48 According to Plaintiffs’ 
theory of liability, Internet intermediaries defending against civil unfair competition claims 
predicated on federal criminal laws (and based on third-party content) would not be able to 
invoke Section 230 immunity.  
III. Section 230 Provides Immunity From Plaintiffs’ Right of Publicity Cause of Action 
and Other Privacy-Based State Law Causes of Action 
 
Plaintiffs’ argument that Section 230 does not apply to state law intellectual property 
claims is irrelevant because their right of publicity claim is not an intellectual property claim.49 
Rather, the right of publicity is a recent offshoot of privacy law.50 Although the right of publicity 
is sometimes loosely referred to as a form of intellectual property, it falls well outside the core of 
intellectual property law. Unlike intellectual property, the right of publicity does not protect 
works of the human intellect.51 Rather, it limits the use of factual information (such as accurate 
visual depictions or biographical information).52 As a privacy right, it stands in marked contrast 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Haskell v. Time, Inc., 965 F.Supp. 1398, 1402 (E.D. Cal. 1997) (“Under § 17200 of the 
California Business and Professions Code, ‘unfair competition’ includes ‘any unlawful, unfair or 
fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.’ A 
private plaintiff may bring an action under §§ 17200 and 17204 to redress any unlawful business 
practice, including an unlawful practice that does not otherwise permit a private right of action, 
such as a criminal statute.”) (footnotes omitted). 
49 For the reasons given in Backpage.com’s motion and reply, amici agree that Plaintiffs’ right of 
publicity claims have not been properly pled.  
50 See Alvarez Guedes v. Marcano Martinez, 131 F. Supp. 2d 272, 278 (D.P.R. 2001) (“the right 
of publicity flows from the right to privacy”); see also Rebecca Tushnet, A Mask that Eats into 
the Face: Images and the Right of Publicity, 38 Colum. J.L. & Arts 1, 3-4 (2015), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2557985. 
51 See Black’s Law Dictionary (10th Ed. 2014) (defining intellectual property as “[a] category of 
intangible rights protecting commercially valuable products of the human intellect”). 
52 See, e.g., Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 168 (3d Cir. 2013) (imposing liability for 
“realistic depictions” of college football players). 
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to copyright and patent law, which have a long history and constitutional pedigree as intellectual 
property rights.53 
 In this case, Plaintiffs assert right of publicity claims founded on the use of their pictures 
for the purpose of advertising.54 This is precisely the kind of allegation that early cases 
characterized as privacy claims.55 In recent years, the right of publicity has grown to include 
aspects of unfair competition such as false endorsement.56 But the right of publicity is still very 
distant from intellectual property. 
Exempting right of publicity claims from Section 230 would frustrate Congress’ purpose 
of protecting free speech online. The right of publicity potentially burdens a staggering range of 
speech. Far from its origins as a limited privacy right, it has since been asserted against 
biographies, comics, songs, computer games, movies, and magazines, and has come to 
encompass virtually anything that “evokes” a specific person.57 In some states, right of publicity 
claims are not even limited to economic harms.58  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (noting that the Copyright Clause and 
the First Amendment were adopted “close in time”). 
54 Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 25-26. 
55 Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905) (the “publication of a picture of 
a person, without his consent, as a part of an advertisement . . . is a violation of the right of 
privacy of the person whose picture is reproduced”); see also Kunz v. Allen, 172 P. 532 (Kan. 
1918); Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 120 S.W. 364, 366 (Ky. 1909). 
56 See Hogan v. A.S. Barnes & Co., 1957 WL 7316, at *11 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1957) (noting that the 
right of publicity is “unfair competition under another label”); see also Restatement (Third) Of 
Unfair Competition §§ 46-49; Richard Ausness, The Right of Publicity: A “Haystack in a 
Hurricane,” 55 Temp. L.Q. 977, 1054 (1982) (“Analytically, the right of publicity could be 
classified as a form of unfair competition.”), available at 
http://uknowledge.uky.edu/law_facpub/392/. 
57 See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003) (painting); Guglielmi v. 
Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal. 3d 860 (1979) (film); Rosemont Enters. v. Urban Sys., Inc., 
340 N.Y.S.2d 144 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973) (board game); Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1062 
(C.D. Cal. 2009) (presidential campaign commercial); Seale v. Gramercy Pictures, 949 F. Supp. 
331 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (book and film); Stewart v. Rolling Stone LLC, 181 Cal. App. 4th 664 
(2010) (magazine feature); Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001) 
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For the reasons given above, the right of publicity should not be considered an 
intellectual property right. 
Finally, even if a right of publicity action were an intellectual property action, 
Section 230 immunity should still apply because Section 230 exempts only federal intellectual 
property claims. The only federal appeals court to squarely address this issue held that Section 
230’s immunity extends to all state laws relating to intellectual property. In Perfect 10, Inc. v. 
CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102 (2007), the Ninth Circuit held that Section 230’s exception for “laws 
relating to intellectual property” applied only to federal claims. The court noted that states have a 
wide variety of laws that, arguably, could be squeezed into the category of intellectual 
property.59 These laws include wide-ranging causes of action such as the right of publicity and 
unfair competition. The court reasoned that including state law causes of action within the 
“intellectual property” exception would create widespread uncertainty as to the scope of the 
exception and impose considerable ligation costs on defendants.60 The court concluded that this 
would “fatally undermine the broad grant of immunity provided by the CDA.”61 
The First Circuit’s decision in Lycos, 478 F.3d at 413, is not to the contrary. In that case, 
the court found that the plaintiffs’ state law trademark dilution claim was not properly pled.62 In 
dicta, the court suggested, but did not decide, that the state law trademark claim related to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(digitally-altered photograph); Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003) (comic 
books); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996) 
(parody trading cards); Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 94 Cal. App. 4th 400 (2001) 
(documentary). 
58 See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992) (defining the 
right as applying to “appropriation of plaintiff’s name or likeness to defendant's advantage, 
commercially or otherwise”) (emphasis added). 
59 Id. at 1107. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 1108. 
62 Id. at 424-25. 
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“intellectual property” law and thus was not subject to Section 230 immunity.63 The court in Doe 
v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 298-99 (D.N.H. 2008), which followed the 
Lycos dicta, thus erred and should not be relied upon here.64 
IV. Section 230 Explicitly Preempts All Inconsistent State Law 
 Section 230 clearly states, “No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be 
imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.”65  
 Plaintiffs’ tortured reading of the word “inconsistent” must be rejected. State and federal 
courts across the country have found state tort law claims to be preempted when they conflict 
with Section 230 by providing for liability where section 230 would provide immunity.66 Indeed, 
courts have held preempted state law tort claims similar to the specific ones asserted in this 
case.67  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Id. at 423 n.7. 
64 In any event, neither Lycos nor Friendfinder considered whether right of publicity claims 
qualify for Section 230 immunity. 
65 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3). 
66 See Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 2006) (“The CDA preempts 
state law that is contrary to this subsection.”); Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co. v. Am. Online, 206 
F.3d 980, 984-85 (10th Cir. 2000) (“47 U.S.C. § 230 creates a federal immunity to any state law 
cause of action that would hold computer service providers liable for information originating 
with a third party.”); Doe v. Am. Online, 783 So. 2d 1010, 1013 (Fla. 2001) (“[We] find that 
section 230 does preempt Florida law as to such a cause of action based upon alleged 
negligence.”); Gentry, 99 Cal. App. 4th at 830 (“Other courts have applied [Section 230 
immunity] to bar not only defamation claims, but other tort causes of action asserted against 
interactive service providers.”). 
67 See Doe v. MySpace, 528 F.3d 413, 420 (5th Cir. 2008) (Section 230 bars claims brought by 
minors asserting negligence in failing to institute safety measures to adequately protect them 
from online predators); Dart, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 969 (Section 230 bars claims that an online 
service provider’s “erotic services” section constitutes a public nuisance because it caused or 
induced prostitution); Backpage.com, LLC v. McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1269, 1273 (W.D. 
Wash. 2012) (finding that the law was likely expressly preempted by Section 230 because it 
treated websites like Backpage.com as the publisher or speaker of information created by its 
users “by imposing liability on Backpage.com . . . for information created by third parties—
namely ads for commercial sex acts depicting minors.”). 
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CONCLUSION 
 For the above-stated reasons, Backpage.com’s motion to dismiss should be granted. 
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